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INTRODUCTION 
There are many ethical considerations when engaging in patent litigation. 
One common area of concern is conflicts of interest. These can arise at 
any stage of a patent litigation and, if not avoided, can have major conse-
quences both for the firm and the client involved in the conflict. 
To understand what conflicts to avoid, this Article looks at recent 
decisions in patent litigation cases where conflict of interest issues have 
been decided. The discussion is divided up as follows. In Part I, choice of 
law regarding conflicts issues is discussed. In Part II, the common issues 
surrounding attorney and/or firm disqualifications for conflicts of interest 
are explored. Part III looks at conflicts of interest involving current 
clients. Part IV examines conflicts of interest concerning former clients. 
In Part V, a different type of conflict of interest—the lawyer as a witness 
situation—is discussed. Part VI moves to conflicts of interests involving 
non-lawyers—specifically judges, experts, and courtroom interpreters. 
Finally, in Part VII, the possible remedies a court may award for such 
conflicts are reviewed. 
I. CHOICE OF LAW 
The Federal Circuit has determined that conflict of interest issues, even if 
arising in patent litigation, is governed by regional circuit law. In Uniloc 
USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the court applied First Circuit law to deter-
mine whether a judge must recuse himself due a conflict of interest.1 The 
same occurred in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Med. Prosthetics Res. 
Assocs., Inc., where Ninth Circuit law was applied to a law firm disqu-
alification motion based on an alleged conflict of interest.2  
The Federal Circuit will even follow the regional circuit’s law on 
when an order disqualifying counsel is appealable. In W.L. Gore, the 
court considered an immediate appeal from such an order because “the 
Ninth Circuit permits the immediate review of the grant of a motion to 
disqualify counsel.”3 
Notably, while prior decisions in this area are not binding on the 
regional circuit or the Federal Circuit, they do influence future Federal 
Circuit cases on the issue. In W.L. Gore, the Federal Circuit was con-
sidering whether a conflict of interest personal to a firm’s attorney could 
                                                        
1. 290 Fed. Appx. 337, 340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
2. 745 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
3. W.L. Gore, 745 F.2d at 1465 (citing Gough v. Perkowski, 694 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 
1982)). 
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be imputed to the whole firm.4 The defense was that the firm had prop-
erly screened off the attorney from the rest of the firm regarding the mat-
ter. The Federal Circuit noted the “Ninth Circuit has expressly left open 
the question of whether firmwide disqualification would be necessary if 
screening procedures were used.”5  
However, the Federal Circuit had considered whether such a defense 
could avoid imputing a conflict before under Seventh Circuit law.6 The 
Federal Circuit was eventually able to avoid speaking first for the Ninth 
Circuit on the validity of this defense.7 Still, the Federal Circuit is clearly 
influenced by its prior decisions on a particular subject matter, even if 
these were made under regional circuit law.  
II. FOUNDATION FOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST REGARDING 
ATTORNEYS/FIRM 
A. Standard When Determining Attorney/Firm 
Disqualification Based on Conflict 
The party bringing a motion to disqualify bears the burden of 
providing the grounds for such disqualification.8 District courts have 
broad discretion to determine whether to disqualify counsel.9 
In general, disqualification is a “harsh sanction” and should “be 
resorted to sparingly.”10 Such motions interfere with the non-moving 
party’s right to freely choose his or her own counsel.11 Further, such 
motions often are interposed for tactical reasons and inevitably cause 
delay12. Accordingly, some circuits have directed that courts faced 
with disqualification motions take a “restrained approach that focuses 
primarily on preserving the integrity of the trial process.”13 A party 
seeking disqualification carries a heavy burden of proof and must 
                                                        
4. Id. at 1466-67. 
5. Id. at 1467 n.6. 
6. Id. at 1466 (Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)) 
7. The court decided that the attorney had not been walled off and thus the rebuttable 
could not be established. Id. 
8. FMC Tech., Inc. v. Edwards, 420 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2006). 
9. Intelli-check, Inc. v. Trico Card Techs., 2008 WL 4682433 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 
2008) (citing Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
10. Norton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 941 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
11. Evans v. Artek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983). 
12. DeFazio v. Wallis, 459 F.Supp.2d 159, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
13. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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demonstrate that, absent disqualification, the trial would be tainted.14 
Moreover, courts considering disqualification must closely examine 
the facts of the case and balance a party’s right to counsel of choice 
against the need to maintain the highest standards of the profession.15 
However, it is also “axiomatic that an attorney must avoid even 
the appearance of a conflict of interest.”16 Courts need to preserve the 
“public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the inte-
grity of the bar.”17  
B. Determining Who is a Client 
Before a conflict of interest based on representation can be 
established, there must be actual representation. An attorney-client 
relationship needs to be identified. 
1. Preliminary Interviews 
In Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu, the court considered a 
motion to disqualify the alleged infringer’s counsel based on a 
conflict of interest.18 The allegation was based on an interview 
between Laryngeal and the firm as possible counsel in the very 
patent infringement suit at bar.  
The central questions were whether the preliminary interview 
created an attorney-client relationship and/or “whether confidences 
were disclosed or legal advice was given that would disqualify [the 
firm] from this action.”  
The court noted that a fiduciary obligation can exist in the 
early stages of a relationship between attorney and client.19 It can 
even arise out of a “preliminary consultations by a prospective 
client with a view to retention of the lawyer, although actual employ-
ment does not result.”20 “When a party seeking legal advice con-
sults an attorney at law and secures that advice, the relation of 
                                                        
14. Evans, 715 F.2d at 791. 
15. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 228-29 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
16. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980). 
17. Dep’t of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1144-47, 
(1999). 
18. 2008 WL 558561 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008). 
19. Id. at *1-2. 
20. Id. at *3 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 
(7th Cir.1978)). 
523
6 
attorney and client is established prima facie. [citations omitted]. 
The primary concern is whether and to what extent the attorney 
acquired confidential information.”21 The focus is on whether the 
meeting went beyond “initial or peripheral contacts.”22  
The court found that, during the preliminary meeting, “an 
implied attorney-client relationship was formed.”23 The stated pur-
pose of the meeting was to determine if the firm was interested in 
and qualified to represent Laryngeal against Ambu. Laryngeal 
brought documents and sample products to explain the case to the 
lawyers, and these documents included confidential notes. Laryn-
geal also “revealed confidential information concerning the sub-
jects of venue, claim construction in relation to the theory of their 
case, and settlement, and that the [firm] lawyers provided strategic 
legal advice about how to proceed on those topics.” The meeting 
lasted over one hour. The court concluded that “the setting was 
appropriate and conducive to establishing an attorney-client rela-
tionship and that the clear intent was to keep the communications 
private.”24 
The attorneys were thus disqualified.25 
2. Joint Defense Arrangements 
Joint defense agreements have become more and more com-
mon as multiple, unrelated companies are being sued on a single. 
The defendants, in order to share resources, commonly enter into 
joint defense agreements. A question can arise as to whether a 
firm’s representation of one of the joint defendants can be consi-
dered a representation of all of the joint defendants. 
Such a situation arose in In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation.26 
In that case, two attorneys of the firm who was representing the 
patentee had been part of a joint defense agreement to which a 
number of defendants were parties. The two attorneys did not 
directly represent any of the defendants in the previous suit. The 
attorneys were also members of a different firm at the time of the 
joint defense agreement.  
                                                        
21. Id. at *3. 
22. Id. at *3-4. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at *4-5. 
25. Id. 
26. 432 F. Supp. 2d 461 (D. N.J. 2006). 
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Some of the defendants in the current action moved to disqua-
lify the firm based on these two attorneys involvement in the prior 
joint defense agreement. The court agreed, finding that the joint 
defense agreement “created a fiduciary and implied attorney-client 
relationship between [the attorneys] and the other [] Defendants.27 
As members of the joint defense team, [the attorneys] received 
confidential information from co-[]Defendants.”28  
III. CONFLICT OF INTEREST BASED ON CURRENT CLIENT  
All jurisdictions have professional rules of responsibility that include a 
rule governing conflicts of interest with current clients. Virginia’s rule on 
this topic, Rule 1.7, is set forth below: 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
will be directly adverse to another existing client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not 
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client 
may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be 
adversely affected; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of 
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation 
shall include explanation of the implications of the common 
representation and the advantages and risks involved.”29 
1. Representation of Related Entity 
A common question in patent infringement cases is whether a 
firm represents an entity related to an adverse party in such a manner 
as to create a conflict. These situations present two questions— 
(1) whether the entities are related enough to consider the adverse 
party a current client and (2) whether this representation renders the 
firm directly adverse to the opposing party.  
                                                        
27. Id. at 463. 
28. Id. 
29. Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7. 
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The court in Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Philips Lumileds Lighting 
Co., was presented with this very issue. 30  In Honeywell, Philips 
Lumileds sought to disqualify Honeywell’s counsel (the “Firm”) based 
on a conflict of interest. Philips Lumileds asserted that the Firm 
represents Philips Electronics North American Corporation (“PENAC”) 
in a variety of legal issues. Philips Lumileds noted that the Firm, in 
representing PENAC, has represented numerous Philips entities includ-
ing Philips Electronics, Philips Consumer Electronics, Philips Health-
care, and Philips Intellectual Property & Standards (Philips IP & S).31 
And due to this representation, PHJW “had access to confidential 
information, including its business plans, legal strategies, and intel-
lectual property protection objectives” and contact with numerous 
Philips executives.32  
Honeywell, in response, conceded that PENCA is the Firm’s 
current client, but that PENAC and Philips Lumileds “are attenuated 
affiliates of one another,” not parent-sub and thus the Firm is not 
adverse to a current client.33  
The court applied ABA Model Rule 1.7 in determining whether 
the Firm should be disqualified. The court concluded that Philips 
Lumileds established both required factual findings under Rule 1.7—
“(1) that [Philips Lumileds] is a current client of the Firm; and  
(2) that the Firm’s representation of Honeywell is directly adverse  
to it.”34 
The court first determined that the “circumstances are such  
that the affiliate,” Philips Lumileds, “should be considered a client.”35 
“[T]he fact of corporate affiliation, without more, does not make all 
of the corporate affiliates a client of a specific lawyer or firm.”36 
However, circumstances, such as “(1) whether the corporation and 
the subsidiary share a common legal department and management 
duties, (2) whether the lawyer’s work for a parent corporation bene-
fits a subsidiary, or (3) whether the lawyer’s work for the parent 
involves collecting confidential information” are relevant to deter-
mining whether the affiliated company is considered a client.37  
                                                        
30. 2009 WL 256831 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2009). 
31. Id. at *1-2. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at *2-3. 
35. Id. at *2-3. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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Philips Lumileds shared the same legal department with PENAC 
and the same “management, computer networks, and marketing 
designs.”38 The Firm also, in its prior representations, had access to 
confidential information on a number of Philips entities. There was 
question as to how representation of PENAC impact Philips Lumileds. 
But “an affiliate’s website ‘confirms the close family relationship of 
the two companies, as well as their integrated business operations and 
interests.’”39  
The court next concluded that “[The Firm’s representation of 
Honeywell is directly adverse.”40 Under the national ABA standard, 
the question is not whether the matters are substantially related. 
“Because Philips Lumileds is considered a client, [the Firm’s] repre-
sentation is clearly adverse to it.”41 And the Firm had not obtained 
consent of both clients—Philips Lumileds and Honeywell—to get the 
conflict waived.42 
The court, in closing, also looked at the balance the likelihood of 
public suspicion against a party’s right to counsel of choice.”43 Here, 
“[t]he subtle legal distinctions between all of its corporate affiliates 
are transparent to the casual observer. The presence of a centralized 
legal team, the current representation of PENAC as a client of the 
Firm, and the high probability of disclosure of confidential informa-
tion lead the Court to give great weight in favor of disqualifying the 
Firm from the present suit.”44  
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITH FORMER CLIENTS 
All jurisdictions have professional rules of responsibility that include a 
rule governing conflicts of interest with former clients. Virginia’s rule on 
this topic, Rule 1.9, is set forth below: 
“(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially 
related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse 
                                                        
38. Id. at *3. 
39. Id. (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Sony Corp., 2004 WL 2984297 (W.D.N.Y. 
2004)). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (citing In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
43. Id. (citing FDIC v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1314 (5th Cir. 
1995)). 
44. Id. at *4-5. 
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to the interests of the former client unless both the present and former 
client consent after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer 
formerly was associated had previously represented a client 
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and 
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by 
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless both 
the present and former client consent after consultation. 
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose 
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter 
shall not thereafter: 
(1) use information relating to or gained in the course of the 
representation to the disadvantage of the former client except 
as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to 
a client, or when the information has become generally known; 
or 
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as  
Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a 
client.”45 
1. “Substantially Related” 
In Apeldyn Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Samsung moved to 
disqualify Apeldyn’s counsel based on a conflict of interest.46 This 
conflict was created by one of the firm’s lawyers having previously 
represented Samsung while at a prior firm in an earlier litigation.47 
The district court found a conflict. 
The Attorney worked on a patent litigation matter for Samsung in 
a previous case while at a prior firm.48 The Attorney was a partner at 
this firm. The subject matter involved alleged infringement by specific 
DRAM chips produced by Samsung.  
Shortly after this litigation ended, Apeldyn’s firm began talking 
to the Attorney while it was pursuing a different infringement case 
against Samsung. The new firm determined that “there was no  
conflict between the work that [the Attorney] had done previously for 
Samsung and [the current firm’s] continued and current representation” 
                                                        
45. Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9. 
46. 693 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D. Del. 2010). 
47. Id. at 401. 
48. Id. at 401-02. 
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adverse to Samsung.49 The Attorney was then hired and not ethical 
screening was imposed to keep the Attorney away from patent 
litigations adverse to Samsung.  
The current firm then sued Samsung in this case on behalf of 
Apeldyn.50 The Attorney was named as counsel for Apeldyn in the 
case. The infringement case involved a “overdrive feature . . . imple-
mented by two semiconductor components: the timing controller  
integrated circuit (T-CON) and DRAM.”51 
In determining Samsung’s motion to disqualify the Attorney and 
the firm from representing Apeldyn, the court looked at Rule 1.9(a) 
regarding conflict of interest and former clients. “Attorney conduct 
will fall within the ambit of the Rule if, inter alia, “the present 
client’s matter [is] the same as the matter the lawyer worked on for 
the first client, or [is] a ‘substantially related’ matter . . . . .”52 “A 
‘substantial relationship’ exists if the similarity between ‘the two 
representations is enough to raise a common-sense inference that 
what the lawyer learned from his former client will prove useful in 
his representation of another client whose interests are adverse to 
those of the former client.’”53  
The court went on to find a “substantial relationship” between  
the prior suit the Attorney worked on and the current suit. The court 
concluded that there is a “substantial relationship” arises from the 
“common-sense inference” that “Apeldyn will necessarily be using 
specimens and documentation that are of the same type, if not the 
same, as those collected and reviewed by [the Attorney] in the [prior] 
litigation.”54 
The court also noted that the firm did not get consent to waive the 
conflict from Samsung.55  
2. Imputing the Conflict to the Entire Firm 
In Intelli-Check, Inc. v. Tricom Card Techs., Inc., the court consi-
dered a motion to disqualify a firm based on one of its current  
                                                        
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 403 (citing Nemours Foundation v. Gilbane, Aetna, Federal Ins. Co., 632 F. 
Supp. 418, 422 (D. Del. 1986)). 
53. Id. (citing Madukwe v. Del. State Univ., 552 F. Supp.2d 452, 458 (D. Del. 2008)). 
54. Id. at 404-05. 
55. Id. at 405-06. 
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Associate’s work at a former firm.56 The court found that the conflict 
could not be imputed to the firm. 
The court applied New York Disciplinary Rule 5-108 that prohi-
bits a lawyer from representing a client who is adverse to a former 
client in the same matter except with consent from the former client 
after full disclosure.57 The court noted that “[a] disqualifying conflict 
exists when: (1) the moving party is a former client of the adverse 
party’s counsel; (2) there is a substantial relationship between the 
subject matter of the counsel’s prior representation of the moving 
party and the issues in the present lawsuit; and (3) the attorney whose 
disqualification is sought had access to, or was likely to have had 
access to, relevant privileged information in the course of his prior 
representation of the client.”58 
Here, the Associate’s conflict was not challenged. Instead the 
focus was whether Associate’s new firm, who represented the alleged 
infringer, should be imputed with this disqualification.59 
“Ordinarily, if an attorney has a conflict with a client, the conflict 
is imputed to the attorney’s entire firm.”60 New York Disciplinary 
Rule 5-105 provides that “[w]hile lawyers are associated in a law 
firm, none of them shall knowingly accept or continue employment 
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from 
doing so under . . . [ (Disciplinary Rule 5-108) ] . . . except as other-
wise provided therein.”61 There is a presumption that the confidences 
and secrets of one attorney are either intentionally or inadvertently 
disclosed to the whole firm. This presumption can be rebutted by 
proper “ethical screens”.62  
However, if the conflict attorney played an “appreciable role”  
in the representing an adversary in the same matter, an ethical screen 
may not avoid imputation.63 And here it appears the Associate played 
such a role. 
                                                        
56. 2008 WL 468433 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008). 
57. Id. at *3-4. 
58. Id. at *4. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (citing Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 133 
(2d Cir. 2005)). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. (citing Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
63. Id. at *4-5. 
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The court focused on other factors that, it concluded, established 
that such screening was effective.64 The court looked at the current 
firm’s size (420 attorneys), its geographic and technological separa-
tion between the Associate and the litigation team, and evidence that 
there had been no discussions between the Associate and the liti-
gation team.65 “The court’s confidence in the effectiveness of the 
screen is further reinforced by the fact [the Associate] had separated 
from his old firm almost two years before the conflict arose.”66 The 
screen was also implemented immediately. 
As a side note, the court also asked that the firm attorney who 
represented both the Associate and the firm in this motion also be 
screened from this litigation.67 The court was surprised that this was 
not done as a matter of course given the circumstances. 
Laryngeal Mask Co. Ltd. v. Ambu also deals with vicarious disqu-
alification. In Laryngeal, the court considered a motion to disqualify 
the alleged infringer’s firm based on a conflict of interest.68 The court 
specifically imputed the conflict of two Attorneys, based on an pre-
liminary interview, to the whole firm. 
The court concluded that the conflict be imputed to the full firm 
even though an “ethical wall around the two attorneys who met with 
Plaintiffs” was erected.  
While ethical screening can avoid imputation in California,69 the 
facts here suggest that the screening will likely not work. Here, the 
lawyers “are in the same District of Columbia office and the clients 
are opponents in the same patent litigation.”70 “The risk of inadver-
tent disclosure of confidential information through casual conversa-
tion is too great and the appearance of divided loyalty is too strong to 
make an exception on these facts.”71 This is particularly likely given 
evidence that attorneys in this office “routinely seek informal advice 
from colleagues.”72  
                                                        
64. Id. at *5. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at *6. 
68. 2008 WL 558561 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008). 
69. Id. at *7 (citing In re County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995-96 (9th Cir. 
2000)). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
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V. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BASED ON THE LAWYER AS  
A WITNESS 
Jurisdictions also have rules governing situations where a lawyer maybe 
a witness. Virginia’s rule on this topic, Rule 3.7, is set forth below: 
“(a) A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in an adversarial proceeding in 
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services 
rendered in the case; or 
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on 
the client. 
(b) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, 
a lawyer learns or it is obvious that the lawyer may be called as a 
witness other than on behalf of the client, the lawyer may continue the 
representation until it is apparent that the testimony is or may be 
prejudicial to the client. 
(c) A lawyer may act as advocate in an adversarial proceeding in which 
another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as witness 
unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or 1.9.”73 
This situation can arise in patent litigations in a number of settings. 
Most revolve around the litigation counsel also being either the prosecu-
tion attorney for the underlying patent or opinion counsel for an alleged 
infringer’s defense to a claim of willfulness. In both situations, the attor-
ney is also a fact witness on issues of inequitable conduct, inventorship, 
or willfulness. This can lead to Rule 3.7 issues and a conflict—with the 
attorney both serving as advocate and as witness. 
In Iguana, LLC v. Lanham, the court considered the patentee’s 
motion to disqualify Lanham’s counsel on a variety of conflict of interest 
grounds.74 One specific allegation was that a member of the representing 
firm was a necessary witness to the action.  
The court noted that disqualify based on an attorney being a witness, 
Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 requires: 
“(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to 
be a necessary witness except where: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services 
rendered in the case; or 
                                                        
73. Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7. 
74. 628 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Ga 2008). 
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(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the 
client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the 
lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from 
doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.”75 
Here, the court found no violation of Rule 3.7. The attorney who was 
potentially going to testify was not named counsel for Lanham.76 He was 
a member of the same firm as named counsel, but Rule 3.7(b) does not 
prohibit such a situation.77 Rule 3.7 “does not recognize imputed disqu-
alification.”78 And there was no indication that there was any other con-
flict of interest with the firm representing Lanham in the present action.” 
VI. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OF OTHERS 
Conflicts can arise causing disqualifications of someone other than counsel 
but still related to the litigation. 
A. Judicial Conflict 
In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit decided 
Uniloc’s appeal of the denial of their motion “to recuse the district 
court judge on the basis that an intern he had hired to assist with the 
case allegedly had ties to Microsoft that would cause a reasonable 
person to question the judge’s impartiality.” 79  
Section 455(a) of title 28 of the United States Code provides that 
“[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”80 The court in Uniloc noted that “[t]he 
key to the analysis is perception, not reality; a judge may be required 
to be recused, even in the absence of an actual bias.”81 Applying cir-
cuit law, a judge must step down “only if the charge against her is 
supported by a factual foundation and ‘the facts provide what an 
objective, knowledgeable member of the public would find to be a 
                                                        
75. Id. at 1373. 
76. Id. at 1373-74. 
77. Id. at 1374. 
78. Id. 
79. 290 Fed. Appx. 337 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
80. Id. at 340. 
81. Id. 
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reasonable basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality.’”82 The judge 
is allowed a range of discretion, and the Federal Circuit focused  
in Uniloc “whether the trial court’s decision can be defended as a 
rational conclusion supported by a reasonable reading of the record.”83 
Uniloc’s argument for recusal focused on the intern’s “financial 
and contractual relationships” with the alleged infringer—Microsoft.84 
The connections were “1) the receipt of royalty payments by Microsoft 
Press pursuant to publishing contracts for four programming guides 
co-authored by the intern and published 9-11 years ago; 2) the assign-
ment of copyrights for his books to Microsoft; 3) a generic expres-
sion of thanks to certain Microsoft and Microsoft Press employees in 
his books; 4) an expression of admiration for Microsoft products in 
articles written and published by him in Microsoft journals; and 5) 
indirect financing for his graduate studies from a Microsoft research 
grant scheduled to expire before the start of his summer internship 
with the district court.”85 
The district court did not abuse its discretion for two reasons.  
The Federal Circuit first noted that the recusal request focused on the 
intern’s conflict of interest, not the district court judge’s.86 And “[t]he 
intern’s connections to Microsoft do not create a conflict of interest 
under the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees.”87 The Federal 
Circuit also emphasized the finding that “the intern’s royalty payments 
or the research funding that had been distributed completely before 
the intern started his internship with the district court.”88 
The Federal Circuit also made a distinction between the intern 
and law clerks in influencing the district court judge. Law clerks could 
be “capable of exerting substantial influence over the judges for whom 
they work.”89 But this does not hold for interns, especially where in 
this case “the district judge explicitly made that point in noting the 
limited and indirect role that the intern would play in the court’s 
decision-making in this case.”90  
                                                        
82. Id. (quoting In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981) (emphasis in 
original)). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 340-41. 
87. Id. at 341. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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Thus, “[u]nder these circumstances, we cannot conclude that  
the district court abused its discretion in finding that no reasonable 
member of the public could question his impartiality.”91 
B. Expert Conflict 
In Northbrook Digital LLC v. Vendio Servs., Inc., the court consi-
dered a motion to disqualify an expert in a patent litigation case 
because of a conflict of interest.92 Northbrook had a single, initial con-
sultation with a professor of computer science prior to the suit that 
was then hired and put forth as an expert by the alleged infringers. 
The standard for “disqualification of expert witnesses for a  
conflict of interest” is a “two part test As this Court has recently 
observed, there is a two part test: disqualification is proper where  
(1) the moving party has an objectively reasonable expectation of a 
confidential relationship with an expert and (2) that party disclosed 
its privileged or confidential information to the expert.”93  
Regarding the first part, the court concluded that there was no 
reasonable expectation of a confidential relationship. The court looked 
to a number of factors, including “whether the expert met once or 
several times with the moving party; was formally retained or asked 
to prepare a particular opinion; or was asked to execute a confi-
dentiality agreement.”94 “[A] reasonable expectation of a confidential 
relationship does not necessarily hinge on whether the expert executed 
a formal retainer or confidentiality agreement.” But when the consul-
tation is an initial one, “the party generally cannot claim a reasonable 
expectation of a confidential relationship.”95  
Here, there was only an initial interview with the expert—a 
professor of computer science. And there was no written agreement 
or informal letter regarding confidentiality.96 There was also no docu-
mentary evidence that confidential information was provided to the 
expert by Northbrook. “This Court expects that, if there was  
                                                        
91. Id. 
92. 2009 WL 5908005 (D. Minn. Aug. 26, 2009). 
93. Id. at *1 (citing Carbomedics, Inc. v. ATS Medical, Inc., 2008 WL 5500760 at *3 
(D. Minn. Apr. 16, 2008)). 
94. Id. at *2 (citing Koch Refining Co., 85 F.3d at 1182; Stencel v. Fairchild Corp., 
174 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Mayer v. Dell, 139 F.R.D. 1, 3 
(D.D.C. 1991)). 
95. 701 F. Supp. 2d 861 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
96. Id. at 862. 
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significant concern about confidentiality, it would be reasonable for 
counsel to make some effort to guard their disclosures.”97 
C. Interpreter Conflict 
The case of Advanced Tech. Incubator, Inc. v. Sharp Corp., 
involves another type of third party conflict.98 Here, the patentee chal-
lenged the use of a particularly interpreter by the alleged infringer 
during trial. The patentee did not challenge the interpreter’s qualifica-
tions. Instead, the patentee alleged a “bias (or, at a minimum, the 
appearance of bias).”  
This potential bias was based on the fact that the interpreter had 
acted, on several prior occasions as the alleged infringer’s “check 
interpreter” during depositions. He also “provided interpreting servic-
es during attorney-client privileged communications between Sharp 
witnesses and Sharp’s counsel in preparing for depositions. [The inter-
preter] also testified that he provided Japanese-language interpretation 
in social settings where Sharp witnesses and Sharp’s counsel were 
present. Sharp’s counsel has paid [the interpreter] at least $22,600 for 
his services (not including expenses).”99 “In light of all of these facts 
and circumstances, [the interpreter’s] service as a trial interpreter in 
this case would raise an appearance of impropriety as to impartiality 
and conflict of interest.” 100  Accordingly, the interpreter was  
disqualified from interpreting at trial. Notably, this holding caused 
the district court to continue the case and give the alleged infringer 
“ample opportunity to obtain services of another trial interpreter.”101 
VII. REMEDY CONSIDERATIONS 
A crucial final question is what remedies are available for such conflicts 
of interest. The common remedy is disqualification, which is discussed  
in detail below. But other unique remedies have been fashioned before 
when the conflicted counsel is not representing either party. 
                                                        
97. Id. 
8. Id.  
98. Id. 
100. Id. at 862-63. 
101. Id. at 863. 
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A. Disqualification of Counsel 
On a motion for reconsideration, the district court in In re 
Gabapentin Patent Litigation considered whether disqualification of 
counsel was the correct remedy for a conflict of interest based on a 
former client.102  
The court noted that “[r]esolution of this issue requires a balanc-
ing of the hardship to the client whose lawyer is sought to be disqu-
alified against the potential harm to the adversary should the attorney 
be permitted to proceed. In addition, the Court must consider its obli-
gation to preserve high professional standards and the integrity of the 
proceedings.”103  
The court determined that there was less harm to the conflicted 
firm’s client then to the alleged infringer. The disqualification was 
early in representation, with the disqualified firm having not “not 
acquired much knowledge about the Gabapentin action because it has 
not been active.”104 The court also noted that “[m]embers of the legal 
profession today are highly mobile. Firm-switching is not uncom-
mon.”105 Therefore, finding new counsel would not be difficult. In 
contrast, the court believed that “the public’s perception of the legal 
profession is enhanced by what the Court admits is an appropriate, 
albeit somewhat strict, application of the ethical rules in this side-
switching context.”106 
B. Nullifying Counsel’s Opinion 
The facts in Andrew Corp. v. Beverly Mfg. Co. present an inter-
esting remedy question from a conflict of interest.107 In Andrew, the 
court threw out three opinions of non-infringement because the firm 
that issued them was representing both Andrew and Beverly Manu-
facturing at the same time. 
The Firm, which did not represent either party in the litigation, 
had both Andrew and Beverly Manufacturing as clients.108 Two of 
                                                        
102. 432 F. Supp. 2d 461 (D. N.J. 2006). 
103. Id. at 464 (citing Essex Chemical Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem., 993 F. 
Supp. 241, 254 (D. N.J. 1998)). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. 415 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
108. Id. at 920-23. 
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the attorneys at the Firm drafted two opinion letters for Beverly, both 
concluding that Beverly did not infringe two of Andrew’s patents.109  
The court determined that, based on these facts, the Firm “took 
positions directly adverse to its client Andrew in the July and August 
2003 opinion letters on behalf of its other client Beverly, without 
obtaining informed consent from both Andrew and Beverly.”110 The 
court found it irrelevant that no Firm lawyer worked on both Andrew 
and Beverly cases, that there was no use of confidential information, 
and that the Firm lawyers did not discuss their concurrent repre-
sentation of Andrew and Beverly.111  
With regards to the remedy, the court held “as a matter of law . . . 
that the July and August 2003 opinion letters were not issued by 
competent opinion counsel.”112 The court concluded that “no opinion 
letter by Barnes & Thornburg while laboring under the unwaived 
conflict of interest, should be used in any manner in this case.”  
The court determined that it could impute the errors of the  
attorneys on Beverly.113 The court also noted that there was no less 
restrictive, adequate remedy available. 114  “If Beverly is allowed  
to use the opinion letters at issue in this case, Andrew will suffer 
because of [the Firm’s] breach of its ethical duty to Andrew. The pub-
lic will also suffer if the opinion letters are used in these proceedings 
because the opinion letters are the product of attorneys laboring under 
an unwaived conflict of interest.”115 
Furthermore, the court had the inherent power to judge the con-
duct of the Firm even if none of their attorneys were counsel of record 
before the court.116 The court also determined, perhaps most impor-
tantly, that the conflict went to the heart of the competency of the 
opinion letters.117 “The primary purpose of a client obtaining a patent 
opinion letter from independent, objective and competent patent coun-
sel is to ‘ensure that it acts with due diligence in avoiding activities 
which infringe the patent rights of others,’” and the conflict of  
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interest put this competency at risk.118 The Firm’s “conflict, which 
arose from the concurrent representation of both Andrew and 
Beverly, who were adverse to one another, prevents [the Firm] from 
being able to provide the type of competent, independent advice and 
opinion letters that the law requires. [the Firm’s] fiduciary duties to 
Andrew prohibited it from taking any position adverse to Andrew.”119  
CONCLUSION 
Conflicts of interest can arise in various stages and aspects of patent 
litigation. The recent cases discussed above provide examples of this. 
And given the dramatic remedies that can result—from disqualification 
to rejection of attorney work product—attorneys need to observe the rele-
vant conflict of interest rules when engaging a client and while litigating 
the case. 
                                                        
118. Id. at 928 (citing Comark Comm'n, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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